Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Db (chronology)' and 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

---

1 idea

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions

14330	To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: It is only to the extent that we relate disposition to 'categorical basis', and difference of disposition to difference of 'categorical basis', that we can speak of dispositions. We must be Realists, not Phenomenalists, about dispositions.
	From: David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 6.VI)
	A reaction: It is Armstrong's realism which motivates this claim, because he thinks only categorical properties are real. But categorical properties seem to be passive, and the world is active.