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7967
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Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
The relation of being taller than is an external relation, since it relates two independent material substances, but the relation of instantiation or exemplification is internal, in that it relates a substance with a property.
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From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
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A reaction:
An interesting revival of internal relations. To be plausible it would need clear notions of 'property' and 'substance'. We are getting a long way from physics, and I sense Ockham stropping his Razor. How do you individuate a 'relation'?
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7934
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Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
Tropes are abstract entities, at least in the sense that more than one can be in the same place at the same time (e.g. redness and roundness). But they are not universals, because they have unique and particular locations.
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From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
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A reaction:
I'm uneasy about the reification involved in this kind of talk. Does a coin possess a thing called 'roundness', which then has to be individuated, identified and located? I am drawn to the two extreme views, and suspicious of compromise.
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7972
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Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
Trope 'Nominalism' is not a version of nominalism, because tropes are abstract particulars, rather than concrete particulars. Of course, a trope account of the relations between particulars and their properties has ramifications for concrete particulars.
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From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16)
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A reaction:
Cf. Idea 7971. At this point the boundary between nominalist and realist theories seems to blur. Possibly that is bad news for tropes. Not many dilemmas can be solved by simply blurring the boundary.
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7960
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Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
Of all the nominalist solutions, Trope Nominalism is the only one that tries to solve the problem at issue by introducing entities; all the others try to get by with concrete particulars and sets of them. This might invite Ockham's Razor.
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From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
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A reaction:
We could reply that tropes are necessities. The issue seems to be a key one, which is whether our fundamental onotology should include properties (in some form or other). I am inclined to exclude them (Ideas 3322, 3906, 4029).
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7951
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Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
We can distinguish between numerical identity and qualitative identity. Numerical sameness is explained by a theory of identity, but what explains qualitative sameness?
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From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
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A reaction:
The distinction is between type and token identity. Tokens are particulars, and types are sets, so her question comes down to the one of what entitles something to be a member of a set? Nothing, if sets are totally conventional, but they aren't.
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7971
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Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
All real forms of Nominalism should hold that the only objects relevant to the explanation of generality are concrete particulars, words (i.e. word-tokens, not word-types), and perhaps sets.
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From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16)
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A reaction:
The addition of sets seems controversial (see Idea 7970). The context is her rejection of the use of tropes in nominalist theories. I would doubt whether a theory still counted as nominalist if it admitted sets (e.g. Quine).
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