display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property [idion] at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 129a27) | |
A reaction: This seems to cramp our style in counterfactual discussion. Can't we even mention an individual property if we believe that it will never exist. Utopian political discussion will have to cease! |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An 'accident' [sumbebekos] is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, such as 'sitting posture' or 'whiteness'. This is the best definition, because it tells us the essential meaning of the term itself. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102b07) | |
A reaction: Thus a car could be red, or not red. Accidents are contingent. It does not follow that necessary properties are essential (see Idea 12262). There are accidents [sumbebekos], propria [idion] and essences [to ti en einai]. |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
Full Idea: Resemblance or similarity is the very core of our concept of a property. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.219) |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Emergent properties are said to be irreducible to, and unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena from which they emerge (as weight is a 'resultant' property, but the transparency of water is an 'emergent' property). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.228) | |
A reaction: So weight is predictable, but transparency is a surprise? But presumably the transparency of water is totally predictable, once you understand it. Emergent properties are either dualist or reducible, in my view. |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
Full Idea: For the emergentist why pain emerges when C-fibres are excited remains a mystery (a 'brute fact'), but such properties then take on a life of their own as 'downward causation'. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.229) | |
A reaction: I don't think there are any 'brute facts', except perhaps at the lowest level of physics. Whatever happened to the principle of sufficient reason? Is the mind like God - a causal source which is uncaused? |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Arguably, properties must be individuated in terms of their causal powers. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.230) |