display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The dispositional and the categorical are correctly understood just as two modes of presentation of the same instantiated properties. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 08.6) | |
A reaction: This is Mumford's own conclusion, after discussing the views of Armstrong. How about 'a disposition is the modal profile' of a categorical property? |
14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Though categorical properties provide explanations for dispositions, categorical properties are also explained by dispositions; hence neither category uniquely explains the other. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 05.3) | |
A reaction: The conclusion doesn't seem to follow. It depends which one is found at the bottom level. It can go up from a basic disposition, to a categorical property, to another disposition - or the other way around. |
14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Four reasons for reducing everything to the categorical are: categorical predicates have wider scope; dispositions are variably realised by the categorical; categorical is 1st order, dispositions 2nd; categorical properties are explanatorily basic. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 08.5) | |
A reaction: I particularly reject the fourth reason, as I take categorical properties as still in need of explanation. The categorical view is contingent (and Humean), but I take the categorical properties to be necessitated by the underlying powers. |
14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
Full Idea: A predicate which is conceptually connected to no function ... is a categorical predicate. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 09.7) | |
A reaction: This is an expansion of Mumford's own theory of dispositions, as functional. Does a cork in a wine bottle have a function, but without doing anything? It seems to achieve its function purely through its structure. |
14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Though lead is said to be composed of molecules of lead, these molecules are not leaden in the everyday sense of the word. This suggests that a property need not be present at the microscopic level in order to be present at the macroscopic level. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 02.3) | |
A reaction: [He quotes Joske] This strikes me as a key principle to grasp about properties. One H2O molecule is not water, any more than a brick is a house! Nearly all properties (or all?) are 'emergent' (in the sensible, non-mystical use of that word). |