display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
| 18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Modes are real beings that stand in non-contingent formal ontological relations both to individual substances and to immanent universals. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.212) | |
| A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I pass it on. 'Modes' seem to invite the Razor, if we already have substances and universals. I am no clear about 'instantiation' because I now have the word 'mode' to play with. |
| 18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Pure trope theorists must apparently hold that each trope has its identity underivatively, not that it depends for it on or owes it to other entities of any sort. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.207) | |
| A reaction: Lowe defends dependent 'modes' of things, against independent 'tropes'. Good, but he then has to say what the thing is (a modeless 'substance'?), because it can't just be a bundle of modes or tropes. |
| 27 | Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nor will the Good be any more good by being eternal, if a long-lasting white thing is no whiter than an ephemeral one. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096b05) | |
| A reaction: A powerful point, made with a hint of sarcasm. You can't add extra Form of White to increase the whiteness of your paint. And the paint is no whiter because it endures for years. |
| 5130 | It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One might ask: what on earth do you mean by speaking of the thing-itself? - assuming the definition of man is one and the same both in man and in man-himself; for qua man they will not differ at all. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a32) | |
| A reaction: Effectively applies Ockham's Razor to the Forms. Do they add anything to our ability to explain? A particular man will have red hair, but a definition of man will mention properties shared by all men. But doesn't man-himself indicate what is essential? |
| 28 | How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: How will one who has had a vision of the Idea itself become thereby a better doctor or general? | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097a12) | |
| A reaction: Plato might reply that it would motivate them. Why would a doctor learn of the skills of their craft if they didn't care about the end result? |