Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Concerning the Author', 'There Are No Abstract Objects' and 'An essentialist approach to Truth-making'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Modes are real beings that stand in non-contingent formal ontological relations both to individual substances and to immanent universals.
     From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.212)
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I pass it on. 'Modes' seem to invite the Razor, if we already have substances and universals. I am no clear about 'instantiation' because I now have the word 'mode' to play with.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Pure trope theorists must apparently hold that each trope has its identity underivatively, not that it depends for it on or owes it to other entities of any sort.
     From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.207)
     A reaction: Lowe defends dependent 'modes' of things, against independent 'tropes'. Good, but he then has to say what the thing is (a modeless 'substance'?), because it can't just be a bundle of modes or tropes.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
     Full Idea: Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims.
     From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1)
     A reaction: If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
     Full Idea: Natural Class Nominalists take as primitive the notion of a 'natural' class - a class of things that all resemble one another in some one respect and resemble nothing else in that respect.
     From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
     A reaction: Dorr rejects this view because he doesn't believe in 'classes'. How committed to classes do you have to be before you are permitted to talk about them? All vocabulary (such as 'resemble') seems metaphysically tainted in this area.