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2 ideas
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: According to Lewis's conception, the causal powers of a property are constituted by its patterned relations to other properties in the particular Humean mosaic that is the actual world. | |
From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by John Hawthorne - Causal Structuralism Intro | |
A reaction: I just can't grasp this as a serious proposal. Relations cannot be the bottom line in explanation of the world. What are the relata? I take powers to be primitive. |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Properties do nothing to capture the causal powers of things. Almost all properties are causally irrelevant, and there is nothing to make the relevant ones stand out from the crowd. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
A reaction: Shoemaker, who endorses a causal account of properties, has a go at this problem in Idea 8557. The property of being massive is more likely to be causal than existing fifty years after D-Day. Lewis attempts later to address the problem. |