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2 ideas
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There is a 'moderate' nominalism (found in G.F.Stout, for example) which says that properties and relations do exist, but that they are particulars rather than universals. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504) | |
A reaction: Both this view and the 'mereological' view seem to be ducking the problem. If you have two red particulars and a green one, how do we manage to spot the odd one out? |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The view that properties exist, but are particulars rather than universals, is still left with the problem of classification. On what basis do we declare that different things have the same property? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504) | |
A reaction: This seems like a fairly crucial objection. The original problem was how we manage to classify things (group them into sets), and it looks as if this theory leaves the problem untouched. |