display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I want to distinguish 'substantial' universals from 'non-substantial' universals. The former are denoted by sortal terms, such as 'statue' and 'tiger', whereas the latter are denoted by adjectival terms, such as 'red' and 'spherical'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.3) | |
A reaction: It is an interesting question whether or not (assuming you are committed to universals) a universal necessarily implies an associated substance. If a property is a power, it must be a power of something. Nominalists will deny his distinction. |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I base my case for realism about universals on the need to explain the status of natural laws. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.6) | |
A reaction: I need black magic to explain why my watch has disappeared. The key question, then, would be what we understand by the 'laws of nature'. I am inclined to think that scientific essentialism (qv) can build laws out of natural kinds. Idea 6614. |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A particular is something (not necessarily an object) which instantiates but is not itself instantiated. Universals, on the other hand, necessarily have instances (or, at least, are instantiable). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This is Lowe's proposal for distinction. It at least establishes the direction of dependency, but I find the notion of 'instantiation' to be as obscure and problematic as the Platonic notion of 'partaking' (see in Ontology|Universals|Platonic Forms). |