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2 ideas
| 12735 | Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It follows from the nature of God that there is a fixed power of a definite magnitude [non vagam] in anything whatsoever, otherwise there would be no reasonings about those things. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (De aequopollentia causae et effectus [1679], A6.4.1964), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6 | |
| A reaction: This is double-edged. On the one hand there is the grand claim that the principle derives from divine nature, but on the other it derives from our capacity to reason and explain. No one doubts that powers are 'fixed'. |
| 15180 | There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysically, nothing in the actual world seems to be a candidate for determining what is necessarily the case. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I file this under 'Dispositions' to show what is at stake in the debate about dispositional and categorical properties. I take a commitment to dispositions to be a commitment to modal facts about the actual world. |