display all the ideas for this combination of texts
11 ideas
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
Full Idea: Being a constituent of probabilistic laws of nature is all there is to being a property. There is no more to temperature than the thermodynamics and other laws they occur in. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: How could thermodynamics be worked out without a prior concept of temperature? I think it is at least plausible to deny that there are any 'laws' of nature. But even Quine can't deny that some things are too hot to touch. |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
Full Idea: To every property there obviously corresponds a possible predicate applying to all and only those particulars with that property. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This doesn't strike me as at all obvious. If nature dictates the properties, there may be vastly more than any human language could cope with. It is daft to say that a property can only exist if humanity can come up with a predicate for it. |
12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The clearest idea of active power comes to us from the mind. So active power occurs only in things which are analogous to minds, that is, in entelechies; for strictly matter exhibits only passive power. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: If this is meant to be a precise argument, then 'so' and 'only' are blatantly unjustified. I guess that if it isn't analogous to a mind then he won't allow it to be a TRUE active power! I say mind arises from the entelechies of the physical brain. |
12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If 'power' is the source of action, it means more than aptitude or ability. It also includes endeavour. It is in order to express this sense that I appropriate the term 'entelechy' to stand for power. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.22) | |
A reaction: An 'entelechy' is, roughly, an instantiated thing, but I like what Leibniz is fishing for here - that we will never understand the world if we think of it as passive. |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Anything which occurs in what is strictly a substance must be a case of 'action' in the metaphysically rigorous sense of something which occurs in the substance spontaneously, arising out of its own depths. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: I love this idea, which fits in with scientific essentialism. The question is whether Leibniz has idenified the end point of all explanations. Cutting edge physics is trying to give further explanations for what seemed basic, such as mass and gravity. |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Primary powers are what make up the substances themselves; derivative powers, or 'faculties' if you like, are merely 'ways of being' - and they must be derived from substances. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.03) | |
A reaction: We might talk of 'deep' and 'surface' properties, or maybe 'powers' and 'qualities' is better. 'Primary' and 'derivative' only gives the logical relationship, but not the causal relationship. |
5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I maintain that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref) | |
A reaction: Thus there could be no 'tabula rasa', because that would be an inactive mental substance. This strikes me as a nice question for modern physicists. Do they regard movement as essential, or an addition to bare particles? I'm with Leibniz. Essentialism. |
12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Powers which are not essential to substance, and which include not merely an aptitude but also a certain endeavour, are exactly what are or should be meant by 'real qualities'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.23) | |
A reaction: An important part of Leibniz's account. There are thus essential powers, in the 'depth' of the substance, and more peripheral powers, which also initiate action, and give rise to the qualities. The second must derive from the first? |
12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Where will one ever find in the world a faculty consisting in sheer power without performing an act? There is always a particular disposition to action, and towards one action rather than another. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: This is muddled. Leibniz defends powers in the possibilities of things, but he must then accept that some possibilities may never be realised, as with two complex chemicals which never ever come into contact with one another. |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
Full Idea: I take the main reason for believing in contingent universals to be the roles they play in causation and in laws of nature, and those laws are what I take to give those universals their identity. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: He agrees with Armstrong. Sounds a bit circular - laws are built on universals, and universals are identified by laws. It resembles a functionalist account of mental events. I think it is wrong. A different account of laws will be needed... |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
Full Idea: One reason for denying that properties just are the meanings of our predicates is that, if they were, they could not give our predicates their meanings. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: Neither way round sounds quite right to me. Predicate nominalism is wrong, but what is meant by a property 'giving' a predicate its meaning? It doesn't seem to allow room for error in our attempts to name the properties. |