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Ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Letters to Frege' and 'The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference'

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1)
     A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9127 Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 6.1
     A reaction: This is the principle stumbling block to any attempt to explain properties purely in terms of sets. I would say that Russell proved there couldn't be a set for each predicate. You can't glibly equate proper properties with predicates.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3)
     A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal).