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2 ideas
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Maybe a disposition is a more fundamental notion than a cause, in which case Lewis has from the very start erred in seeking a causal analysis, in a traditional, conceptual sense, of disposition terms. | |
| From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 2.2.8 | |
| A reaction: Is this right about Lewis? I see him as reducing both dispositions and causes to a set of bald facts, which exist in possible and actual worlds. Conditionals and counterfactuals also suffer the same fate. |
| 21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We are aware of the universal 'yellow'; this universal is the subject in such judgements as 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does'. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911], 154), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 2.3 | |
| A reaction: This still seems one of the strongest examples in support of universals. You could hardly be talking about yellow tropes in such instances (even if the world does contain yellow tropes). |