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3 ideas
| 5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We can know the properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence between sense-data and reality, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the relations hold. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: Thus Russell always puts great emphasis on relations in his metaphysics. I would say that he is right, and that what he calls the 'nature of the terms' are essences, and that these are knowable, by inference and explanation. |
| 5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London, but this involves the universal 'north of', so we must admit that relations are not dependent upon thought, but belong to the independent world which thought apprehends. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: We cannot deny that Edinburgh being north of London is independent of our minds, but we might deny that 'north of' is a universal. 'North' is clearly a human convention, but 'nearer a pole' isn't. Distances exist in space, rather than as relations. |
| 14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
| A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |