Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Elements of Mind' and 'Assertion'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane]
     Full Idea: The distinction between 'resultant' properties like weight, and 'emergent' properties like colour, seems intuitive enough, but on examination it is very hard to make precise.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18)
     A reaction: It is no coincidence that the examples are of primary and secondary qualities. If 'the physical entails the mental' then all mental properties are resultant.
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane]
     Full Idea: Whatever the causal process is, it remains true that if emergentism is true, the completeness of physics is false; there are some effects which would not have come about if mental things were absent from the world.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18)
     A reaction: Emergentism looks to me like an incoherent concept, unless it is another word for dualism.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
     Full Idea: Frege's theory of properties (which he calls 'concepts') yields too few properties, by identifying coextensive properties, and also too many, by letting every predicate express a property.
     From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §2
     A reaction: Seems right; one extension may have two properties (have heart/kidneys), two predicates might express the same property. 'Cutting nature at the joints' covers properties as well as objects.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are causes [Crane]
     Full Idea: Properties are causes.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17)
     A reaction: We can't detect properties if they lack causal powers. This may be a deep confusion. Properties are what make causal powers possible, but that isn't what properties are?