Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Varieties of Things' and 'The Enneads'

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

7965	Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: An object's being two inches long seems to guarantee an infinite number of other properties, such as being less than three inches long. If we must understand the second property to understand the first, then there seems to be a vicious infinite regress.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2)
	A reaction: She dismisses this by saying that we don't need to know an infinity of numbers in order to count. I would say that we just need to distinguish between intrinsic and relational properties. You needn't know all a thing's relations to know the thing.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

7934	Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: Tropes are abstract entities, at least in the sense that more than one can be in the same place at the same time (e.g. redness and roundness). But they are not universals, because they have unique and particular locations.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: I'm uneasy about the reification involved in this kind of talk. Does a coin possess a thing called 'roundness', which then has to be individuated, identified and located? I am drawn to the two extreme views, and suspicious of compromise.

7958	Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: Trope Nominalism says properties are classes or sets of exactly similar or resembling tropes, where tropes are what we might called 'property-tokens' or 'particularized properties'.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
	A reaction: We still seem to have the problem of 'resembling' here, and we certainly have the perennial problem of why any given particular should be placed in any particular set. See Idea 7959.

7972	Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: Trope 'Nominalism' is not a version of nominalism, because tropes are abstract particulars, rather than concrete particulars. Of course, a trope account of the relations between particulars and their properties has ramifications for concrete particulars.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16)
	A reaction: Cf. Idea 7971. At this point the boundary between nominalist and realist theories seems to blur. Possibly that is bad news for tropes. Not many dilemmas can be solved by simply blurring the boundary.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes

7959	How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: The problem is how a group of resembling tropes can be of the same type, that is, that they can resemble one another in the same way. This problem is not settled simply by positing tropes.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
	A reaction: There seems to be a fundamental fact that there is no resemblance unless the respect of resemblance is specified. Two identical objects could still said to be different because of their locations. Is resemblance natural or conventional? Consider atoms.

7960	Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
	Full Idea: Of all the nominalist solutions, Trope Nominalism is the only one that tries to solve the problem at issue by introducing entities; all the others try to get by with concrete particulars and sets of them. This might invite Ockham's Razor.
	From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
	A reaction: We could reply that tropes are necessities. The issue seems to be a key one, which is whether our fundamental onotology should include properties (in some form or other). I am inclined to exclude them (Ideas 3322, 3906, 4029).