Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Realistic Rationalism', 'talk' and 'Letters to Des Bosses'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I do not say there is a chain midway between matter and form, but that the substantial form and primary matter of the composite, in the Scholastic sense (the primitive power, active and passive) are in the chain, and in the essence of the composite.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: Note that this implies an essence of primitive power, and not just a collection of all properties. This is the clearest account in these letters of the nature of the 'substantial chain' he has added to his monads.
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The first entelechy of a composite is a constitutive part of the composite substance, namely its primitive force.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: For me, Leibniz's most interesting proposal is to characterise Aristotelian 'form' as an active thing, which offers an intrinsic account of movement, and a bottom level for explanations. There always remains the inexplicable. Why anything? Why this?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway]
     Full Idea: If it were asserted that the Form of the Beautiful was itself beautiful, such a statement would require a prior understanding of the concept of beauty, so would immediately lead to an infinite regress, so the Forms can't be self-predicating.
     From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This is a nice clear statement of the mess that Plato gets himself into if he wants the Forms to be self-predicating. Clearly the Form of the Beautiful can't be beautiful, but must be that which gives other things their beauty.