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15745
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Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
One and the same universal recurs; it is multiply located; it is wholly present in both instances, a shared common part whereby the two instances overlap. Being alike by sharing a universal is 'having something in common' in an absolutely literal sense.
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From:
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
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A reaction:
A helpful spelling out of the commitment involved (in Armstrong and others) in belief in universals. To me this is a convenient list of reasons why the whole proposal is nonsense. Why does Lewis take them seriously?
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7034
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Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil]
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Full Idea:
Universals can explain the one-over-many problem, and easily explain similarity relations between objects, and explain the similar behaviour of similar objects.
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From:
John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 13.1)
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A reaction:
A useful summary. If you accept it, you seem to be faced with a choice between Plato (who has universals existing independently of particulars) and Armstrong (who makes them real, but existing only in particulars).
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15747
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Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
It cannot be said that a universal is instantiated by anything that has it as a part, since the relation of part to whole is transitive. If charge is part of a particle, which is part of an atom, then charge is part of the atom, but an atom isn't charged.
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From:
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
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A reaction:
Given the total mystery involved in 'instantiation', it wouldn't surprise me if someone appealed to the part-whole relation, but all moves to explain instantiation are desperate. Make it a primitive, if you must, then tiptoe away.
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