display all the ideas for this combination of texts
13 ideas
| 15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: There is a distinction between powers, and the properties in virtue of which things have they powers they have (n8: 'in virtue of' means that there is a lawlike truth, which turns out to be the properties entailing the powers). | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §03) | |
| A reaction: To me this is an ontology which rests something very clear (a power) on something very indeterminate (a 'property'). |
| 8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: It is possible to have the same power (e.g. being poisonous) in virtue of having very different properties. ..So it is in virtue of a thing's properties that the thing has the powers that it has. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §03) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as an accurate and helpful picture. It means that true properties give rise to powers, and categorial or relational or whimsical properties must have their ontological status judged by that standard. |
| 8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Powers are functions from circumstances to causal effects, and properties (on which powers depend) can be thought of as functions from sets of properties to sets of powers. Maybe we should call properties 'second-order powers', as they produce powers. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §04) | |
| A reaction: He presents property as both a function, and a component of the function. This is the core picture on which modern scientific essentialism is built. See under Natural Theory|Laws of Nature. |
| 12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
| Full Idea: I am against Shoemaker's strong dispositionalism, according to which all genuine properties are dispositional. | |
| From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980]) by Brian Ellis - The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism 3 | |
| A reaction: This is because Ellis argues that some properties are categorical, and are needed to underly the active dispositional ones. I think I side with Shoemaker, but this needs more thought. |
| 8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: My account of properties concerns those with respect to which change is possible; it is not intended to apply to such properties of numbers as being even and being prime. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §02) | |
| A reaction: You could argue that while these properties may not cause change, they are abstract powers. Being even allows division by 2, and being prime blocks it. I say patterns are the basis, and dividing groups of physical objects is involved. |
| 15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Surely we make a distinction beween dispositional and nondispositional properties, and can mention paradigms of both sorts. ....It seems plain that predicates like 'square', 'round' and 'made of copper' are not dispositional. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §03) | |
| A reaction: It might be possible to account for squareness and roundness in dispositional ways, and it is certainly plausible to say that 'made of copper' is not a property (even when it is a true predicate). |
| 15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: What makes a property the property it is, what determines its identity, is its potential for contributing to the causal powers of the things that have it. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §04) | |
| A reaction: Does this mean that the 'potential' to act is the essence of the property, or is a property of the property, or is wholly identical with the property? Or is this just epistemological - whatever individuates the property for observers? |
| 15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: A thing has a 'conditional power' when it has a power conditionally upon the possession of certain properties. ...We can then express my view by saying that properties are clusters of conditional powers. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §04) | |
| A reaction: His example is a knife-shaped thing, which conditionally cuts wood if it is made of steel. Shoemaker rejected this in 1998. Mumford/Anjum prefer the earlier view. Which is fundamental? Powers are simple and primitive. Properties are complex. |
| 15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Could a thing undergo radical change with respect to its properties without undergoing any change in its causal powers, or undergo radical change in its causal powers without undergoing any change in the properties that underlie these powers? | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05) | |
| A reaction: I don't accept properties underlying powers, but these two questions at least force us to see how closely the two are linked. |
| 8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: The disassociation of property identity from causal potentiality is an invitation to eliminate reference to properties from our explanatory hypotheses altogether. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05) | |
| A reaction: Just as epiphenomenalism about consciousness is a step towards eliminativism. This seems to describe Quine's reaction to Goodman, in moving from predicate nominalism to elimination of properties. I agree with Shoemaker. |
| 4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: The notion of a property and the notion of a causal power belong to a system of internally related concepts, no one of which can be explicated without the use of the other. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §07) | |
| A reaction: Sounds good. It is hard to conceive of a property which has no causal powers, or a causal power that doesn't arise from a property. |
| 15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: I should probably modify my view, and say that properties are individuated by their possible causes as well as by their possible effects. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §11) | |
| A reaction: (This is in an afterword responding to criticism by Richard Boyd) He doesn't use the word 'individuate' in the essay. That term always strikes me as smacking too much of epistemology, and not enough of ontology. Who cares how you individuate something? |
| 8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: By and large, dispositional predicates ascribe powers while nondispositional monadic predicates ascribe properties that are not powers in the same sense. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §03) | |
| A reaction: The powers are where the properties come into contact with the rest of the world, so you would expect dispositions to be found at that level, rather than at the deeper level of properties. Sounds good to me. |