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Ideas for 'Causality: Reductionism versus Realism', 'Substance' and 'Perception'

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins]
     Full Idea: x bears to y the 'ancestral' of the relation R just if either x bears R to y, or x bears R to some w that bears R to y, or x bears R to some w that bears R to some z that bears R to y, or.....
     From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.10.1)
     A reaction: A concept invented by Frege (1879).
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Some thinkers claim the physical world consists just of relational properties - generally of active powers or fields; ..but an ontology of mutual influences is not an ontology at all unless the possessors of the influence have more substantial features.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)
     A reaction: I think this idea is one of the keys to wisdom. It is the same problem with functional explanations - you are left asking WHY this thing can have this particular function. Without the buck stopping at essences you are chasing your explanatory tail.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
     Full Idea: Substances are things that have a source of change or principle of activity within them.
     From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.4.1)
     A reaction: A vey significant concession. I think we can talk of 'essences' and 'powers', and drop talk of 'substances'. 'Powers' is a much better word, because it immediately pushes the active ingredient to the forefront.