display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: If a priori atomism is a true theory of the world, then all properties are derivative from ultimate properties. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there is a physicalist metaphysic underlying this, which means that even abstract properties derive ultimately from these physical atoms. Unless we want to postulate logical atoms, or monads, or some such weird thing. |
| 11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: A property like 'being physical' is just a second-order property. ...It is not required as a first-order property. ...Higher-order properties earn their keep as necessity-makers. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.2) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be correct and very important. People who like 'abundant' properties don't make this distinction about orders (of levels of abstraction, I would say), so the whole hierarchy has an equal status in ontology, which is ridiculous. |
| 11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: The canonical name for a property that is a non-power is 'categorical property'. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 10.2) | |
| A reaction: Molnar objects that this implies that powers cannot be used categorically, and refuses to use the term. There seems to be uncertainty over whether the term refers to necessity, or to the ability to categorise. I'm getting confused myself. |
| 11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Are tropes transferable? ...If tropes are not dependent on their bearers, that is a trope-theoretic version of Platonism. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.6) | |
| A reaction: These are the sort of beautifully simple questions that we pay philosophers to come up with. If they are transferable, what was the loose bond which connected them? If they aren't, then what individuates them? |