display all the ideas for this combination of texts
17 ideas
14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Dispositions are attacked as either just saying how something will behave (logical fictions about regularities of events), or as primitive pre-scientific terms like 'phlogiston', place-holders used when we are ignorant of real properties. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 01.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The first view he calls the Ryle-Wittgenstein view, which seems to track back to Hume. |
14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
Full Idea: We might claim that dispositions are variably realized by a number of categorical bases; therefore they must be distinct from those bases. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 05.4) | |
A reaction: Cars can be realised by a variety of models, therefore models are not cars? This might work if dispositions are only characterised functionally, as Mumford proposes, but I'm not convinced. |
14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
Full Idea: A dispositional property is the classification of a property according to its functional role....[p.85] What is essential to a disposition - its identity condition - is its functional role. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.5) | |
A reaction: This is Mumford's view of dispositions. I am wary of any proposal to define something according to its role, because it must have an intrinsic nature which equips it to have that role. |
14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The view I promote is one where the categorical base is a cause of the disposition manifestation. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 05.5) | |
A reaction: It seems to me (I think) that the most basic thing has to be a power, whose nature is intrinsically beyond our grasp, and that categorical properties are the result of these powers. Powers are dispositional in character. |
14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
Full Idea: It seems that every property must be a causal power, since every property must be causally potent (as a necessary condition of its very existence). | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.7) | |
A reaction: Mumford cautiously endorses this idea, which seems to rest on the thesis that 'to exist is to have causal powers'. I think I am even keener on it than Mumford is. Powers and properties need to be disentangled, however. |
14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Understanding intrinsic properties as being causal powers is likely to be most profitable, and, if true, renders the causal criterion of property existence true analytically. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 06.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites E.Fales on this] I'm inclined to think that in the ultimate ontology the notion of a 'property' drops out. There are true causal powers, and then conventional human ways of grouping such powers together and naming them. |
14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Dispositions are ascribed to at least three distinguishable classes of things: objects, substances, and persons. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Are dispositions not also ascribed to properties? Magnetism has a disposition to attract iron filings? |
14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The idea of a disposition occupying a different causal role involves a conceptual confusion, ...but there is no conceptual or logical absurdity in a categorical base occupying a different causal role. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 07.3) | |
A reaction: This is the core of Mumford's theory of dispositions. I'm beginning to think that dispositions are merely ways we have of describing and labelling functional mechanisms, and so 'dispositions' drop out of the final story. |
14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
Full Idea: For some the notion of a disposition is contrasted with the notion of an occurrence; for others, it is contrasted with that of a categorical property. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 01.6) | |
A reaction: I vote for dispositions over the other two, but I take the categorical properties to be the main rival. |
14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The realist says that disposition ascriptions are ascriptions of real powers. This leaves unanswered the question, 'power to do what?' The problem of background conditions means that the realist cannot say what it is that a power is a power to do. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.9) | |
A reaction: It is hard to say what a disposition will do, under any other account of dispositions. I would take a power to be defined by a 'modal profile', rather than an actual account of what it will lead to. |
14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Dispositions can regain the metaphysical role traditionally ascribed to real powers: the that-in-virtue-of-which-something-will-G, if F. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 06.9) | |
A reaction: The attraction is that dispositions can be specified a little more clearly (especially in Mumford's functional version) whereas there may be no more to say about a power once it has been located and named. |
14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The orthodox realist view has it that what makes an ascription a disposition ascription is not that it is equivalent to a conditional proposition but that it entails one. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.7) | |
A reaction: Mumford says that Martin has shown that dispositions need not entail conditionals (when a 'fink' is operating, something which intervenes between disposition and outcome). |
14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
Full Idea: It seems plausible that a disposition could be possessed though no manifestation events occur. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 01.6) | |
A reaction: It is more than 'plausible' - it is screamingly obvious to everybody, apart from a few philosophers. "Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest" (Gray's Elegy). |
14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Dispositions should correctly be understood as more than mere possibilities. To say something has a disposition is to say something about how it is actually. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], Pref) | |
A reaction: To me this is a basic axiom of metaphysics. The word 'power' serves well for the actual embodiment of a disposition. A power gives rise to one or more dispositions. Or one or more powers give rise to a disposition? |
14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Given any event, and the assumption that every event has a cause, then some power can always be invented as the cause of that event. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 06.6) | |
A reaction: This is a useful warning, and probably explains why 'powers' fell out of fashion in scientifice theorising. They seem to make a return, though, as an appropriate term for the bottom level of each of our explanations. |
14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
Full Idea: In the old-fashioned sense, 'powers' are real potentialities that initiate changes but seem to have a mysterious existence in between those changes. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 07.10) | |
A reaction: What is a person when they are asleep? What is a dishwasher when it isn't running? What is gunpowder when it doesn't explode? We all understand latent powers. To see them as a 'mystery' is to want to know too much. |
14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The categorical eliminativist claims that there are no dispositional properties. All properties must be conceived of as categorical states or mechanisms, in the spirit of Boyle's explanation of powers. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 08.3A) | |
A reaction: What is the difference between a structure and a mechanism? How do we distinguish an active from an inactive mechanism? Without powers or dispositions, nature is dead junk. |