display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
10472 | 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver] |
Full Idea: The 'structural universals' methane and butane are each made up of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen. | |
From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §07) | |
A reaction: He cites Lewis 1986, who is criticising Armstrong. If you insist on having universals, they might (in this case) best be described as 'patterns', which would be useful for structuralism in mathematics. They reduce to relations. |
10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
Full Idea: So-called aristotelian universals have some queer features: one universal can be wholly present at different places at the same time, and two universals can occupy the same place at the same time. | |
From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11) | |
A reaction: If you want to make a metaphysical doctrine look ridiculous, stating it in very simple language will often do the job. Belief in fairies is more plausible than the first of these two claims. |
10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
Full Idea: If universals are to ground similarities, it is hard to see why one should admit universals which only happen to be instantiated once. | |
From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11) | |
A reaction: He is criticising Armstrong, who holds that universals must be instantiated. This is a good point about any metaphysics which makes resemblance basic. |
7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
Full Idea: Properties and relations of abstract objects may need to be acknowledged, but they would have no spatio-temporal location, so they cannot instantiate Aristotelian universals, there being nowhere for such universals to be. | |
From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11), quoted by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things | |
A reaction: Maybe. Why can't the second-order properties be in the same location as the first-order ones? If the reply is that they would seem to be in many places at once, that is only restating the original problem of universals at a higher level. |
7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
Full Idea: Uninstantiated properties and relations may do some useful philosophical work. | |
From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11), quoted by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things | |
A reaction: Their value isn't just philosophical; hopes and speculations depend on them. This doesn't make universals mind-independent. I think the secret is a clear understanding of the word 'abstract' (which I don't have). |
10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
Full Idea: We may have to accept uninstantiated universals because the properties and relations of abstract objects may need to be acknowledged. | |
From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11) | |
A reaction: This is the problem of 'abstract reference'. 'Courage matters more than kindness'; 'Pink is more like red than like yellow'. Not an impressive argument. All you need is second-level abstraction. |
10722 | Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver] |
Full Idea: One view of instantiation is that it is the set-membership predicate. | |
From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §10) | |
A reaction: This cuts the Gordian knot rather nicely, but I don't like it, if the view of sets is extensional. We need to account for natural properties, and we need to exclude mere 'categorial' properties. |