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2 ideas
11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
Full Idea: For the nominalist, belonging to the extension of a predicate is just an inexplicable ultimate fact. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.2) | |
A reaction: I sometimes think of myself as a nominalist, but when it is summarised in Molnar's way I back off. He seem to be offering a third way, between platonic realism and nominalism. It is physical essentialist realism, I think. |
11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
Full Idea: A nominalist will only countenance first-order logic. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.2.2) | |
A reaction: This is because nominalist will not acknowledge properties as entities to be quantified over. Plural quantification seems to be a strategy for extending first-order logic while retaining nominalist sympathies. |