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7 ideas
21347 | If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato] |
Full Idea: When you say Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, so you mean there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness? - I do. ...But surely he is not taller than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he happens to have? | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102b-c) | |
A reaction: He adds that both people must be cited. This appears to be what we now call a rejection relative height as an 'internal' relation, which is it would presumably be if it was a feature of one or of both men. |
8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Realists feel that the one-place predication 'a is F' leaves something unexplained, yet all that is offered is a two-place predication (a relational statement). There is an equal problem about 'a having F-ness'. | |
From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.97) | |
A reaction: I think this is a key argument on the nominalist side - the denial that the theory of universals actually makes any progress at all in giving an explanation of what is going on around here. Platonist have the problem of 'partaking'. |
360 | We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: We must have some previous knowledge of equality, before the time when we saw equal things, but realised that they fell short of it. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 075a) |
1 | There is only one source for all beauty [Plato] |
Full Idea: If anything is beautiful other than beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason but because it participates in that beautiful. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 100c) | |
A reaction: The Greek word will be 'kalon' (beautiful, fine, noble). Like Aristotle, I find it baffling that such diversity could have a single source. Beautiful things have diverse aims. |
368 | Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato] |
Full Idea: The reason why other things are called after the forms is that they participate in the forms. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102a) |
8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Talk of 'particulars' and 'universals' clutters the landscape without adding to our understanding. We should rest with the basic fact that a is F. | |
From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.98) | |
A reaction: Ramsey was first to challenge the basic distinction. I find the approach of Quine and Devitt unsatisfactory. We abandon explanation when it is totally hopeless, but that is usually in the face of complexity. Properties are difficult but simple. |
8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
Full Idea: For 'a and b have the same property, F-ness' the Quinean Nominalist has a paraphrase to hand: 'a and b are both F'. ..In denying that this object need have properties, the Quinean is not denying that it really is F. | |
From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.95) | |
A reaction: The question that remains is why 'F' is used of both a and b. We don't call a and b 'a', because they are different. Quine falls back on resemblance. I suspect Quineans of hiding behind the semantics. |