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23 ideas
5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Not all meaningful statements are sentences. One could try a programme of eliminating from discourse all words which imply universals. Daily physical life would survive all right, but universities would close down. |
4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
Full Idea: In general, adjectives and nouns express properties of things, whereas prepositions and verbs express relations between things, so neglect of the latter led to the belief that every proposition attributes properties rather than relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: A simple point on which Russell was very keen to insist, and which seems right. It invites the question whether there are further universals, beyond properties and relations. |
5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
Full Idea: The monism of Spinoza and Bradley, and the monadism of Leibniz, result, in my opinion, from an undue attention to one sort of universals, namely the sort represented by adjectives and substantives rather than by verbs and prepositions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: The 'linguistic turn' of 20th century philosophy, which should be treated with caution, but I agree that if we are going to accept universals, we need a wide vision of what categories they might fall into. I would prefer an ontology without 'relations'. |
4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
Full Idea: Russell denies that universals have any location at all. ..He is generalising from the case of "is north of", which does not exist any more in Edinburgh than in London. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) by Michael J. Loux - Metaphysics: contemporary introduction p.55 | |
A reaction: Russell may claim that the relation "is north of" is natural, but I suspect that it is a convention, mapped onto a physical situation. Reifying relations invite charges of a regress (as Bradley noted). |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: No sentence can be made up without at least one word which denotes a universal. ..Thus all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Sounds right, and is a beautifully neat way of showing the connection between metaphysics and life. |
4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Russell's positive argument for universals is that they explain how we can have a priori knowledge, which 'deals exclusively with the relations of universals'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §3 | |
A reaction: Unfortunately we can invent the universals, and then delude ourselves that we have a priori knowledge |
5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
Full Idea: We think of things existing when they are in time (though possibly at all times), but universals do not exist in this sense, so we shall say that they 'subsist' or 'have being'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Russell picked up the word 'subsist' from medieval philosophy. This idea brings the full Platonic metaphysics with it, which is tricky, to say the least. But what can you do? Admitting the content of thought brings baggage with it. |
5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
Full Idea: If whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. What many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a powerful argument in favour of thinking of universals as in some sense real - but in what sense? The crux is that Russell shows that we must find a place in our ontology for the content of thoughts, as well as of thoughts. |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |