display all the ideas for this combination of texts
24 ideas
8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: "The Thames is broad in London" might be taken as 'The Thames is broad-in-London', or as 'The Thames is-in-London broad', or as 'The Thames-in-London is broad'. I would urge the superiority of the second one, as an analysis of the normal meaning. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5.8) | |
A reaction: He uses the example to attack the perdurance view of objects (i.e. the third analysis). I think I agree with Lowe, but I'm not sure, and I just love the example. Read the second as 'The Thames is (in London) broad'? 'Is' of existence, or predication? |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers call particularised properties of objects 'tropes', but I prefer the older term 'mode' (or 'individual accident'), because this term rightly has the implication that such entities are existentially dependent ones, depending on objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that philosophical terminology is not as metaphysically innocent as it sometimes pretends to be. I agree with Lowe. |
8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I do not believe that tropes or modes can have well-defined or fully determinate identity-conditions, and hence do not believe that they should be thought of as 'objects'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3) | |
A reaction: Lowe's account would still allow them to be 'entities'. Any proposal that they have an existence of their own, apart from the objects on which they depend, sounds very misguided. We won't make progress if we don't identify the real properties. |
8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It seems that tropes are identity-dependent upon their possessors, but it is difficult to square this claim with the thesis that the possessors of tropes are themselves just bundles of tropes. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8) | |
A reaction: This circularity in all attempts to individuate tropes is Lowe's main reason for rejecting them. It does seem that the sphericity of a ball must be either identified against other (universal) sphericities, or by the sphere that has the property. |
8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Why cannot a certain trope 'float free' of the trope-bundle to which it belongs and migrate to another bundle? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8) | |
A reaction: Tropes are said to be dependent on their possessors, but at the same time to exist as particulars. Lowe's suggestion is that you can't have it both ways. A particular sphericity with no sphere does not even make sense. |
8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If a round ball fits snugly into a round piece of plaster, do they contain the same roundness trope, or do they contain numerically distinct but exactly similar and coinciding roundness tropes? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8) | |
A reaction: A microscope would distinguish them, and they are made of different types of matter. Is a hole in a piece of paper a circular cut and a circular area of space? Neither example looks good for tropes. |
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I want to distinguish 'substantial' universals from 'non-substantial' universals. The former are denoted by sortal terms, such as 'statue' and 'tiger', whereas the latter are denoted by adjectival terms, such as 'red' and 'spherical'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.3) | |
A reaction: It is an interesting question whether or not (assuming you are committed to universals) a universal necessarily implies an associated substance. If a property is a power, it must be a power of something. Nominalists will deny his distinction. |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I base my case for realism about universals on the need to explain the status of natural laws. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.6) | |
A reaction: I need black magic to explain why my watch has disappeared. The key question, then, would be what we understand by the 'laws of nature'. I am inclined to think that scientific essentialism (qv) can build laws out of natural kinds. Idea 6614. |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A particular is something (not necessarily an object) which instantiates but is not itself instantiated. Universals, on the other hand, necessarily have instances (or, at least, are instantiable). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This is Lowe's proposal for distinction. It at least establishes the direction of dependency, but I find the notion of 'instantiation' to be as obscure and problematic as the Platonic notion of 'partaking' (see in Ontology|Universals|Platonic Forms). |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |