Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense' and 'Universals'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism

4459	Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
	Full Idea: Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals.
	From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2)
	A reaction: Clearly there is going to be quite a struggle to make sense of 'exists' here (Russell tries 'subsists). Presumably each property must be a particular?

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

4458	Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
	Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalism is clearly superior to Class Nominalism, since the former offers a clear ground for distinguishing between natural and unnatural classes.
	From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2)
	A reaction: Important. It seems evident to me that there are natural classes, and the only ground for this claim would be either the resemblance or the identity of properties.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism

4457	There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
	Full Idea: Linguistic predicates are neither sufficient nor necessary for specifying a property. Predicates can be contrived which express no property, properties are far more numerous than linguistic predicates, and properties are what make predicates apply.
	From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2)
	A reaction: This seems to me conclusive, and is a crucial argument against anyone who thinks that our metaphysics can simply be inferred from our language.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

4471	We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
	Full Idea: Some argue that compared to sets, the identity conditions for properties are obscure, and so properties, including realist depictions of them, should be rejected.
	From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6)
	A reaction: I have never thought that difficulty in precisely identifying something was a good reason for denying its existence. Consider low morale in a work force. 2nd thoughts: I like this!