display all the ideas for this combination of texts
27 ideas
15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
Full Idea: That the most noteworthy property of this bed is that George Washington slept in it - surely this is true on some legitimate conception of properties? | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Wrong! This example is a nice clear test case. This is an absurd slippery slope. A bed he once looked at? I would have thought this was a relation the bed once entered into, and a relation isn't a property. |
15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I have made no place for properties that admit of degree, so that things may have more or less of the same property. There are plain properties, and then there are relations to them. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: An interesting question, little discussed. Elsewhere, Lewis ascribes all vagueness to our inadequate predicates, rather than to the world, which I find quite persuasive. |
9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Properties are 'sparse' or 'abundant'. The abundant properties may be as extrinsic, as gruesomely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunctive, as you please. They pay no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up every which way. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a logician's idea, which is needed for the notion of a set as pure extension, but it has very little to do with what I understand by the word 'property'. Better to call it a 'categorization'. E.g. filing George W. Bush under 'jackal'. |
15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To deserve the name of 'property' is to be suited to play the right theoretical role. It is wrong to speak of 'the' role associated with the word 'property', as if it were fully and uncontroversially settled. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Once again I see a chicken-and-egg problem. Surely something has a theoretical role because of its intrinsic character, or its prior definition? How could you formulate a theory if you lacked properties? We don’t meet properties as gaps in theories. |
15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A property can be unnatural by reason of disjunctiveness, as the property of being tripartite-or-liquid-or-cubical is, and it is intrinsic if its disjuncts are. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being utterly, shockingly and disgracefully wrong. A disjunction can't possibly be a property. Can a person have the property of being 'fat or thin'? A disjunction offers candidates for properties, not the properties themselves. |
15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
Full Idea: It cannot be said that all intrinsic properties are perfectly natural, ...but it can plausibly be said that all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Idea 15742 give the example he uses to support this claim. I like the concept of 'intrinsic' properties, but cannot currently see any use for the concept of 'natural' ones. |
15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
Full Idea: If a globally intrinsic properties are those that never vary between duplicates across possible worlds, then necessarily coextensive properties will either be both intrinsic or both extrinsic. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], p.61-2) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 'Analysis' | |
A reaction: Presumably this problem would arise if some intrinsic property entailed an extrinsic property (or, less likely, vice versa). These sorts of problems arise when you try to define everything extensionally (even across possible worlds). |
15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Lewis defines a globally intrinsic property as one that never varies between duplicates across possible worlds. This has the immediate problem that any property that is necessarily had, or necessarily lacked, by every thing will be intrinsic. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], p.61-2) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 'Analysis' | |
A reaction: [He also cites Langton and Lewis 1998] To me this is the sort of tangle you get into when you equate properties with predicates. The problem seems to concern necessary predicates (but those may not be necessary properties). |
15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We might try defining the natural properties by a short list, of the mass properties, charge properties, quark properties and flavours... | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5 n47) | |
A reaction: He rejects this because of possible natural properties in other possible worlds. Defining anything by a list seems like cheating. Does John, Paul, George and Ringo 'define' something? |
14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Sharing of [perfectly natural properties] makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not highly miscellaneous. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: All this sounds like just what I want, but when I read Lewis he seems to be arriving at these natural properties by the wrong route. Too much Hume, too much extensionalism. |
15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Shall we say that natural properties are the ones whose instances are united by resemblance? - Not if we are going to say that resemblance is the sharing of natural properties. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: The target of this appears to be the proposal of Quinton. By now I have totally given up on so-called 'natural' properties. Lewis says the circularity (also in Idea 15743) is a reason to treat 'natural' here as primitive (though he rejects that). |
15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Shall we say that natural properties are the ones that figure in laws of nature? - Not if we are going to use naturalness of properties when we draw the line between laws of nature and accidental regularities. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Personally I wouldn't dream of defining anything by saying that it figured in laws of nature. The laws, if there be such (see Mumford) are built up from more fundamental components, such as (perhaps) properties. |
15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Some people suppose my natural properties are distinguished by nature, and hence natural in one world and not another. I intend properties to be natural or unnatural simpliciter, not relative to one or another world. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5 n44) | |
A reaction: This is an important warning for the likes of me. I've have begun to doubt the utility of the term 'natural' property, and this reinforces my view. |
16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
Full Idea: Lewis surveys three accounts of sparse properties: a set of objects instantiating a single universal; a set of objects having as parts duplicates of some trope; and a set distinguished by a further unanalyzable, primitive characteristic of naturalness. | |
From: report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], p.60-) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics | |
A reaction: The very idea of suggesting that a property is some set of objects strikes me as bizarre. I present you with a table full of objects and say that is the complete set of some property. You then have to study the objects to find out what the property is. |
15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The abundant properties far outrun the predicates of any language we could possibly possess. ...Properties are as abundant as the sets, because for any set whatever, there is the property of belonging to that set. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: The idea of calling such things 'properties' strikes me as preposterous, but it is interesting that we confront truths which outrun our predicates. We can't have all of these predicates together, but there is no impediment to any one of them. |
10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Lewis proposes that a property is the set of its actual and possible instances. | |
From: report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 10 | |
A reaction: I just can't make sense of any proposal that a property is a set. Things fall into natural sets because they have properties. Only a philosopher would believe such a weird proposal as this one. Triangular and trilateral? |
15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
Full Idea: Lewis thought that the property of being F was identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F. | |
From: report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], §1.5) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties | |
A reaction: I can't make head or tail of a theory which says that a property is a set of objects. I'll show you a room full of objects and tell you they are a property. How are you going to work out what the property is? 'Being F' is a predicate, not a property! |
15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The usual objection to taking properties as sets is that different properties may happen to be coextensive. Creatures with hearts are creatures with kidneys. Talking donkeys are flying pigs (since there are none). Yet the properties differ. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is the difficulty which Lewis proposes to solve by defining properties across possible situations as well as actual ones, so that the properties can come apart. Nice move. |
15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In modal realism, 'accidentally coextensive' properties are not coextensive. They only appear so when we ignore their other-worldly instances. If we consider all instances, then it never can happen that two properties are coextensive but might have been. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: It is not clear why this 'can never happen'. Maybe even God can't make a hearted creature without kidneys. Lewis is aware of this question. |
15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A property that is instantiated in a relative way (such as being a father or a son) could not be the set of its instances? Is the thing to be included in the set or not? | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: He says philosophers contrive ways to define properties as functions, but he prefers to call such properties 'relations', and define them that way. It never even occurred to me that 'being a son' was one of my properties, but what do I know? |
9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We can't take a property as sets of this-worldly instances, because two properties may be coextensive. Some say it is just as bad in all possible worlds, if the property is necessary, as when all triangles are trilateral, which seem different. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Renate/cordate is the standard example of the first problem. Lewis seems to equivocate over exactly what is meant by a property. I take the example to be a powerful objection to treating properties as sets. |
16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I believe in properties. That is, I have my candidates for entities to play the role and deserve the name. My principal candidates are sets of possible individuals. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 3.4) | |
A reaction: I am bewildered by any claim that a property is a 'set'. The property of being a teaspoon is just a large pile of teaspoons (one pile in each possible world)? This is the tyranny of first-order logic in philosophy. Are sets more real than properties? |
9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The simplest plan for properties is to take a property just as the set of all its instances. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I find this a weird and counterintuitive proposal. I suppose if you think maths has been reduced to set theory, you might want to reduce everything else, and then we can all go home. I thought things were in sets because of their properties. |
9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If you will not countenance primitive similarity in any form, then trope theory is not for you. But if you will, then duplication of tropes is an especially satisfactory form of primitive similarity to take. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This presents the question about tropes in a beautifully simple form. Perfect similarities seem fine, but partial similarities (red and pink things) are hard, and abstract reference (pinkness and redness) is even harder. |
15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Trope theory has the drawback that we need the primitive notion of duplicate tropes, whereas with universals we just say that it is one and the same universal through some charged particles. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: The normal term for this primitive is 'perfect resemblance', though that seems to make close resemblance a bit complicated and puzzling. I'm not sure if I understand resemblance as a feature of the world, rather than of our minds. |
15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Trope theory cannot analyse similarity, because duplication of tropes is itself a primitive relation of similarity. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: A reasonable reply to this one, I think, is that no one can explain or analyse similarity. To say that the same universal (or bunch of graded universals) is instantiated explains nothing. Maybe type-identity must be primitive in any theory? |
15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Trope theory needs a primitive notion - 'instantion' in yet another sense - to say how the tropes that comprise a particle are united. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Any theory which says that objects are just 'bundles' of tropes is asking for trouble. But if you say (with Lowe and others) that tropes are 'modes' of existing entities, you still have to give an account of the entity. |