display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
| 5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
| A reaction: Not all meaningful statements are sentences. One could try a programme of eliminating from discourse all words which imply universals. Daily physical life would survive all right, but universities would close down. |
| 4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In general, adjectives and nouns express properties of things, whereas prepositions and verbs express relations between things, so neglect of the latter led to the belief that every proposition attributes properties rather than relations. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: A simple point on which Russell was very keen to insist, and which seems right. It invites the question whether there are further universals, beyond properties and relations. |
| 5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The monism of Spinoza and Bradley, and the monadism of Leibniz, result, in my opinion, from an undue attention to one sort of universals, namely the sort represented by adjectives and substantives rather than by verbs and prepositions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: The 'linguistic turn' of 20th century philosophy, which should be treated with caution, but I agree that if we are going to accept universals, we need a wide vision of what categories they might fall into. I would prefer an ontology without 'relations'. |
| 4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
| Full Idea: Russell denies that universals have any location at all. ..He is generalising from the case of "is north of", which does not exist any more in Edinburgh than in London. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) by Michael J. Loux - Metaphysics: contemporary introduction p.55 | |
| A reaction: Russell may claim that the relation "is north of" is natural, but I suspect that it is a convention, mapped onto a physical situation. Reifying relations invite charges of a regress (as Bradley noted). |
| 4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
| Full Idea: No sentence can be made up without at least one word which denotes a universal. ..Thus all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Sounds right, and is a beautifully neat way of showing the connection between metaphysics and life. |
| 4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Russell's positive argument for universals is that they explain how we can have a priori knowledge, which 'deals exclusively with the relations of universals'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §3 | |
| A reaction: Unfortunately we can invent the universals, and then delude ourselves that we have a priori knowledge |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We think of things existing when they are in time (though possibly at all times), but universals do not exist in this sense, so we shall say that they 'subsist' or 'have being'. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Russell picked up the word 'subsist' from medieval philosophy. This idea brings the full Platonic metaphysics with it, which is tricky, to say the least. But what can you do? Admitting the content of thought brings baggage with it. |
| 5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. What many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me a powerful argument in favour of thinking of universals as in some sense real - but in what sense? The crux is that Russell shows that we must find a place in our ontology for the content of thoughts, as well as of thoughts. |