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10 ideas
17170 | An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: By 'attribute' I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if constituting its essence. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Def 4) | |
A reaction: Note that we would call these 'properties', but Spinoza has a word reserved for the properties of essences. He also has 'modes' of a thing, which are different. |
5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG] |
Full Idea: 'Dispositional' properties involve behaviour, and 'categorical properties' are structures in two or more dimensions. 'Block' structures (e.g. molecules) depend on other things, and 'instrinsic' structures (e.g. fields) involve no separate parts. | |
From: report of Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This is an essentialist approach to properties, and sounds correct to me. The crucial preliminary step to understanding properties is to eliminate secondary qualities (e.g. colour), which are not properties at all, and cause confusion. |
5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis] |
Full Idea: 'Categorical realism' is the most widely accepted theory of dispositional properties, because passivists can accept it, ..that is, that dispositions supervene on categorical properties; ..the opposite would imply nature is active and reactive. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Essentialists believe 'the opposite' - i.e. that dispositions are fundamental, and hence that the essence of nature is active. See 5468 for explanations of the distinctions. I am with the essentialists on this one. |
17171 | A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: By 'mode' I understand the affections [affectiones] of substance, or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Def 5) | |
A reaction: The attributes actually make up the essential consitution of the thing, and then the modes are entirely dependent on that essence. This is thoroughly Aristotelian, even though 'substantial forms' had been given up by this date. |
5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Redness is not a property, because it has no mind-independent existence. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Well said. Secondary qualities are routinely cited in discussions of properties, and they shouldn't be. Redness causes nothing to happen in the physical world, unless a consciousness experiences it. |
17195 | Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The force by which each thing perseveres in its existence follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 45) | |
A reaction: This I take to be an ontology of fundamental powers, but with divine backing, similar to that found in Leibniz. Modern powers theorists leave out God, since it doesn't seem to add anything. [Is this the idea of 'conatus'?] Darwin can't explain the force. |
17206 | The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The effort by which each thing endeavours to persevere in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 07) | |
A reaction: This is exactly the sort of thing that Leibniz frequently said. They were much more conscious of the active power of essences than in the scholastic tradition. This is Nietzsche's will to power. Spinoza talks of 'power' in his demonstration of this. |
5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis] |
Full Idea: One cannot think of a property as just a set of objects in a domain (as Fregean logicians do), as though the property has no powers, but is just a way of classifying objects. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I agree. It is sometimes suggested that properties are what 'individuate' objects, but how could they do that if they didn't have some power? If properties are known by their causal role, why do they have that causal role? |
5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis] |
Full Idea: With few, if any, exceptions, the fundamental properties of physical theory are dispositional properties of the things that have them. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: He is denying that they are passive (as Locke saw primary qualities), and says they are actively causal, or else capacities or propensities. Sounds right to me. |
17192 | The 'universal' term 'man' is just imagining whatever is the same in a multitude of men [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Confused notions called 'universal', such as 'man', have arisen because so many images of individual men are formed that they exceed the power of imagination, ...so it imagines that only in which all of them agree, ...expressed by the name 'man'. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 40) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] This strikes me as correct. I don't see how you can discuss universals without bringing in the way in which human psychology operates. |