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Ideas for 'Principles of Philosophy', 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' and 'Models'

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties

5468	Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG]
	Full Idea: 'Dispositional' properties involve behaviour, and 'categorical properties' are structures in two or more dimensions. 'Block' structures (e.g. molecules) depend on other things, and 'instrinsic' structures (e.g. fields) involve no separate parts.
	From: report of Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: This is an essentialist approach to properties, and sounds correct to me. The crucial preliminary step to understanding properties is to eliminate secondary qualities (e.g. colour), which are not properties at all, and cause confusion.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties

5469	The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
	Full Idea: 'Categorical realism' is the most widely accepted theory of dispositional properties, because passivists can accept it, ..that is, that dispositions supervene on categorical properties; ..the opposite would imply nature is active and reactive.
	From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4)
	A reaction: Essentialists believe 'the opposite' - i.e. that dispositions are fundamental, and hence that the essence of nature is active. See 5468 for explanations of the distinctions. I am with the essentialists on this one.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

5456	Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
	Full Idea: Redness is not a property, because it has no mind-independent existence.
	From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Well said. Secondary qualities are routinely cited in discussions of properties, and they shouldn't be. Redness causes nothing to happen in the physical world, unless a consciousness experiences it.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

16744	All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
	Full Idea: There are no powers in stones and plants that are not so mysterious that they cannot be explained …from principles that are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position, and motion of particles of matter.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], IV.187), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
	A reaction: This is an invocation of 'categorical' properties, against dispositions. I take this to be quite wrong. The explanation goes the other way. What supports the structures; what drives the motion; what initiates anything?

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties

5481	Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis]
	Full Idea: One cannot think of a property as just a set of objects in a domain (as Fregean logicians do), as though the property has no powers, but is just a way of classifying objects.
	From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7)
	A reaction: I agree. It is sometimes suggested that properties are what 'individuate' objects, but how could they do that if they didn't have some power? If properties are known by their causal role, why do they have that causal role?

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions

5458	Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
	Full Idea: With few, if any, exceptions, the fundamental properties of physical theory are dispositional properties of the things that have them.
	From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3)
	A reaction: He is denying that they are passive (as Locke saw primary qualities), and says they are actively causal, or else capacities or propensities. Sounds right to me.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

5016	Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
	Full Idea: The five commonly enumerated universals are: genus, species, difference, property and accident.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)
	A reaction: Interestingly, this seems to be Descartes passing on his medieval Aristotelian inheritance, in which things are defined by placing them in a class, and then noting what distinguishes them within that class.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

5015	A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Universals arise solely from the fact that we avail ourselves of one idea in order to think of all individual things that have a certain similitude. When we understand under the same name all the objects represented by this idea, that name is universal.
	From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)
	A reaction: Judging by the boldness of the pronouncement, it looks as if Descartes hasn't recognised the complexity of the problem. How do we spot a 'similarity', especially an abstraction like 'tool' or 'useful'? This sounds like Descartes trying to avoid Platonism.