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3 ideas
3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
Full Idea: Some system features cannot be figured out just from the composition of the elements of the system and environmental relations; they have to be explained in terms of causal relations among the elements. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 5.I) | |
A reaction: One must explain at the molecular level why an apple skin is both red and smooth. In the brain one must explain the movement of glucose and the contents of thoughts by their causal relations (I say). |
3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
Full Idea: The existence of any fully 'emergent' properties (that have a life of their own) violates even the weakest principle of the transitivity of causation. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 5.I) | |
A reaction: When Searle talks like this, he sounds like a thoroughgoing reductive physicalist (but is he really?). Any philosopher of mind who uses the word 'emergence' must say EXACTLY what they mean by it. |
12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Over and above what can be deduced from extension, we must add and recognise in bodies certain notions or forms that are immaterial, so to speak, or independent of extension, which you can call powers [potentia], by which speed is adjusted to magnitude. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Natura Corporis [1678], A6.4.1980), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
A reaction: He boldly asserts that the powers are 'immaterial', but is then forced to qualify it (as he often does) with 'so to speak'. The notion that bodies just have extension (occupy space) comes from Descartes, and is firmly opposed by Leibniz. |