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3 ideas
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §18) | |
A reaction: The term 'red' may be assigned to a range of colours, but we also recognise the precision of 'that red'. For 'electron', or 'three', or 'straight', the particulars are indistinguishable. |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §24) | |
A reaction: A nice point against universals. Maybe gods only think in particulars. One particular on its own could never suggest a universal. How are you going to spot patterns if you don't think in universals? Maths needs patterns. |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Universality, so far as I can comprehend it, does not consist in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §15) | |
A reaction: I always think it is a basic principle in philosophy that some sort of essence must precede relations (and functions). What is it about universals that enables them to have a relation to particulars? |