display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
16670 | Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: An accident is a mode of conceiving a body. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.02) | |
A reaction: In contrast to the other thinkers who followed Suárez on modes in the early 17th century, Hobbes thinks they are just ways of 'conceiving' bodies, rather than actual features of them. |
16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: An accident's being in a body is not to be taken as something contained in that body - as if redness were in blood like blood in a bloody cloth, as part of the whole, for then accident would be a body. It is like body having size or rest or movement. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.03) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Hobbes is fishing for something like the Quinean view of properties, but no one seems to be able to articulate this sceptical view very well. Pasnau says he means to talk of 'the mode of conceiving a body' (De C 8.2). |
16734 | The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The power of agent and patient taken together, which may be called the complete power, is the same as the complete cause, for each consists in the aggregation together of all the accidents that are required to produce an effect in both agent and patient. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.10.01) | |
A reaction: They treat powers as macro phenomena, and don't seem to have a sense of the basic powers that build up the big picture. |
12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I do not say there is a chain midway between matter and form, but that the substantial form and primary matter of the composite, in the Scholastic sense (the primitive power, active and passive) are in the chain, and in the essence of the composite. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: Note that this implies an essence of primitive power, and not just a collection of all properties. This is the clearest account in these letters of the nature of the 'substantial chain' he has added to his monads. |
12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The first entelechy of a composite is a constitutive part of the composite substance, namely its primitive force. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29) | |
A reaction: For me, Leibniz's most interesting proposal is to characterise Aristotelian 'form' as an active thing, which offers an intrinsic account of movement, and a bottom level for explanations. There always remains the inexplicable. Why anything? Why this? |
17247 | The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Nothing is general or universal besides names or signs. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.05) | |
A reaction: This is the perfect motto for nominalists, among which I am inclined to include myself. Hobbes had a fabulous gift for economy of phrasing. This website is dedicated to that ideal. Reality does not contain generalities (obviously!!). |