Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Elements of Mind', 'Phaedo' and 'Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000'

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato]
     Full Idea: When you say Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, so you mean there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness? - I do. ...But surely he is not taller than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he happens to have?
     From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102b-c)
     A reaction: He adds that both people must be cited. This appears to be what we now call a rejection relative height as an 'internal' relation, which is it would presumably be if it was a feature of one or of both men.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane]
     Full Idea: Whatever the causal process is, it remains true that if emergentism is true, the completeness of physics is false; there are some effects which would not have come about if mental things were absent from the world.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18)
     A reaction: Emergentism looks to me like an incoherent concept, unless it is another word for dualism.
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane]
     Full Idea: The distinction between 'resultant' properties like weight, and 'emergent' properties like colour, seems intuitive enough, but on examination it is very hard to make precise.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18)
     A reaction: It is no coincidence that the examples are of primary and secondary qualities. If 'the physical entails the mental' then all mental properties are resultant.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are causes [Crane]
     Full Idea: Properties are causes.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17)
     A reaction: We can't detect properties if they lack causal powers. This may be a deep confusion. Properties are what make causal powers possible, but that isn't what properties are?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato]
     Full Idea: We must have some previous knowledge of equality, before the time when we saw equal things, but realised that they fell short of it.
     From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 075a)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
     Full Idea: If anything is beautiful other than beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason but because it participates in that beautiful.
     From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 100c)
     A reaction: The Greek word will be 'kalon' (beautiful, fine, noble). Like Aristotle, I find it baffling that such diversity could have a single source. Beautiful things have diverse aims.
Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
     Full Idea: The reason why other things are called after the forms is that they participate in the forms.
     From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102a)