display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Neo-Humean metaphysics holds the view that there are no substantial connections between anything in this world. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1) | |
A reaction: A very illuminating comment. This exactly fits Lewis's great 'mosaic' of facts. The challenge is to say what 'substantial' relations there might be, but I'm quite happy to have a go at that. |
22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: It is said that that properties divide into two mutually exclusive types—non-dispositional qualities (sometimes called 'categorical properties’) vs. non-qualitative dispositions—of which the qualities are more fundamental than dispositions. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 8) | |
A reaction: It is standardly understood that the qualitative categorical properties are more fundamental. Fans of powers (such as Ingthorsson and myself) either favour the dispositional properties, or reject the distinction. |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
Full Idea: Whatever the causal process is, it remains true that if emergentism is true, the completeness of physics is false; there are some effects which would not have come about if mental things were absent from the world. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: Emergentism looks to me like an incoherent concept, unless it is another word for dualism. |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
Full Idea: The distinction between 'resultant' properties like weight, and 'emergent' properties like colour, seems intuitive enough, but on examination it is very hard to make precise. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: It is no coincidence that the examples are of primary and secondary qualities. If 'the physical entails the mental' then all mental properties are resultant. |
22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
Full Idea: Is the negative charge of an electron a quality or power? It is clear that physics describes the nature of charge only in terms of what its bearer can do. | |
From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 8.06) | |
A reaction: The point is that an electron has properties, even though it has no observable qualities. Ingthorsson says the scientific concept of qualities is entirely about what something can do, and ot how it is perceived. |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Properties are causes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17) | |
A reaction: We can't detect properties if they lack causal powers. This may be a deep confusion. Properties are what make causal powers possible, but that isn't what properties are? |