Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Natural Kinds', 'Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford' and 'Realistic Rationalism'

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2 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions

16948	Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
	Full Idea: Once we can legitimize a disposition term by defining the relevant similarity standard, we are apt to know the mechanism of the disposition, and so by-pass the similarity.
	From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.135)
	A reaction: I love mechanisms, but can we characterise mechanisms without mentioning powers and dispositions? Quine's dream is to eliminate 'similarity'.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent

16945	We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
	Full Idea: Intuitively, what qualifies a thing as soluble though it never gets into water is that it is of the same kind as the things that actually did or will dissolve; it is similar to them.
	From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.130)
	A reaction: If you can judge that the similar things 'will' dissolve, you can cut to the chase and judge that this thing will dissolve.