display all the ideas for this combination of texts
13 ideas
5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG] |
Full Idea: 'Dispositional' properties involve behaviour, and 'categorical properties' are structures in two or more dimensions. 'Block' structures (e.g. molecules) depend on other things, and 'instrinsic' structures (e.g. fields) involve no separate parts. | |
From: report of Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This is an essentialist approach to properties, and sounds correct to me. The crucial preliminary step to understanding properties is to eliminate secondary qualities (e.g. colour), which are not properties at all, and cause confusion. |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
Full Idea: We may define a physical property as one whose value is relevant, in some circumstances, to how a physical system is likely to act. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: Fair enough, but can we use the same 'word' property when we are discussing abstractions? Does 'The Enlightenment' have properties? Do very simple things have properties? Can 'red' act, if it isn't part of any physical system? |
5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis] |
Full Idea: 'Categorical realism' is the most widely accepted theory of dispositional properties, because passivists can accept it, ..that is, that dispositions supervene on categorical properties; ..the opposite would imply nature is active and reactive. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Essentialists believe 'the opposite' - i.e. that dispositions are fundamental, and hence that the essence of nature is active. See 5468 for explanations of the distinctions. I am with the essentialists on this one. |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
Full Idea: I want to insist on the existence of a class of categorical properties distinct from causal powers. This is contentious, for there is a growing body of opinion that all properties are causal powers. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: Alexander Bird makes a case against categorical properties. If what is meant is that 'being an electron' is the key property of an electron, then I disagree (quite strongly) with Ellis. Ellis says they are needed to explain causal powers. |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Essentialist metaphysics seem to require that there be at least two kinds of properties in nature: dispositional properties (causal powers, capacities and propensities), and categorical ones (spatiotemporal and numerical relations). | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: At last someone tells us what a 'categorical' property is! Couldn't find it in Stanford! Bird and Molnar reject the categorical ones as true properties. If there are six cats, which cat has the property of being six? Which cat is 'three metres apart'? |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Spatial, temporal and numerical relations can have various causal roles without themselves being instances of causal powers. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: He cites gaps, aggregates, orientations, approaching and receding, as examples of categorical properties which make a causal difference. I would have thought these could be incorporated in accounts of more basic causal powers. |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
Full Idea: To regard properties as sets of individuals, and relations as sets of ordered individuals, is to make a nonsense of the whole idea of discovering a new property or relationship. Sets are defined or constructed, not discovered. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: This bizarre view of properties (as sets) drives me crazy, until it dawns on you that they are just using the word 'property' in a different way, probably coextensively with 'predicate', in order to make the logic work. |
5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Redness is not a property, because it has no mind-independent existence. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Well said. Secondary qualities are routinely cited in discussions of properties, and they shouldn't be. Redness causes nothing to happen in the physical world, unless a consciousness experiences it. |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
Full Idea: A causal power can never be dependent on anything that does not have any causal powers. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Sounds right, though you worry when philosophers make such bold assertions about such extreme generalities. But see Idea 12667. This is, of course, the key argument for saying that causal powers are the bedrock of reality, and of explanation. |
5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis] |
Full Idea: One cannot think of a property as just a set of objects in a domain (as Fregean logicians do), as though the property has no powers, but is just a way of classifying objects. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I agree. It is sometimes suggested that properties are what 'individuate' objects, but how could they do that if they didn't have some power? If properties are known by their causal role, why do they have that causal role? |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Ellis allows categoricals alongside powers, …to influence the sort of manifestations produced by powers. He lists structures, arrangements, distances, orientations, and magnitudes. | |
From: report of Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009]) by Neil E. Williams - The Powers Metaphysics 05.2 | |
A reaction: I would have thought that all of these could be understood as manifestations of powers. The odd one out is distances, but then space and time are commonly overlooked in every attempt to produce a complete ontology. [also Molnar 2003:164]. |
5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis] |
Full Idea: With few, if any, exceptions, the fundamental properties of physical theory are dispositional properties of the things that have them. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: He is denying that they are passive (as Locke saw primary qualities), and says they are actively causal, or else capacities or propensities. Sounds right to me. |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
Full Idea: The causal powers are just a proper subset of the dispositional properties. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 5) | |
A reaction: Sounds wrong. Causal powers have a physical reality, while a disposition sounds as if it can wholly described by a counterfactual claim. It seems better to say that things have dispositions because they have powers. |