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Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Remarks on axiomatised set theory' and 'Dispositions'
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26 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
16113
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Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle]
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16114
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Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
11387
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The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis]
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15773
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Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle]
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14294
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Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14310
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Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
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14317
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I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
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14316
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If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
16753
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Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
15780
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Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle]
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14313
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All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
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14318
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Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14293
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Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
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14326
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Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
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14298
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Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
14314
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If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
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14325
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Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
14312
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Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
11938
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The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle]
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15766
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Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle]
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15767
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Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14291
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Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
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14299
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There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14323
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If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
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14328
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Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
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14331
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Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
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