Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Causal Powers', 'Causes and Events: Mackie on causation' and 'New work for a theory of universals'

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30 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
8571 Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15281 Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden]
10717 Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
16217 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
8613 Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
8585 Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
8586 Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
8589 For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
15460 All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
15726 Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18433 There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
8604 We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
15279 Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden]
15276 Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden]
15305 Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
15218 Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden]
15302 We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden]
15303 Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15258 Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
15120 Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15315 What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8569 I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
21961 Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8576 The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
8574 Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]