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Ideas for 'In Praed.', 'Four Dimensionalism' and 'Universals'

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19 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
14194 Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
4461 Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4462 A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
4463 In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
4451 If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
4453 One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
4464 Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
4449 Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland]
4450 The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
4454 The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
4468 How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
4452 Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
4467 A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
4469 There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
4472 Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
4459 Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4458 Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4457 There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
4471 We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]