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Ideas for
'works', 'Essence and Potentiality' and 'On the Plurality of Worlds'
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39 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
14502
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Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15751
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Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
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15735
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Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
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9656
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The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15737
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To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15742
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A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
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15397
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If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
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15398
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Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
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15741
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All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15752
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We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
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14996
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Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
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15744
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We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
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15743
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Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
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15740
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I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
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16262
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Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
15739
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There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10723
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A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
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15399
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The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
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15732
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Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
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15733
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Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
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15734
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If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
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9655
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Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
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16290
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I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
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9653
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It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
9657
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You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
15750
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Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
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15749
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Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
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15748
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Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954
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Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15745
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Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
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15746
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If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
15747
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Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
20906
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Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
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3039
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When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
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17948
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Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
556
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If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
563
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If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
565
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The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
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557
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A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
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