Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions' and 'Dispositions'

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39 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21534 The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
21540 Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
14333 Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
14302 A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14294 Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
14313 All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
14318 Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14298 Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
14293 Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
14326 Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
14314 If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
14325 Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
14312 Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14291 Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
14299 There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
223 If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
227 You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
210 It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
220 The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
211 If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
219 If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
228 Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
16151 Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
215 If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
212 The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
218 Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
213 Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
216 If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
217 Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
214 If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]