Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'On the Plurality of Worlds' and 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth'
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45 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15751
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Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
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15735
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Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
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9656
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The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15737
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To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15742
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A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
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15741
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All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
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15398
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Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
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15397
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If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15752
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We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
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14996
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Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
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15744
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We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
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15743
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Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
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15740
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I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
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16262
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Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
15739
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There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10723
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A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
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15399
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The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
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15732
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Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
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15733
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Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
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15734
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If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
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9655
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Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
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16290
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I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
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9653
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It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
9657
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You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
15749
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Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
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15750
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Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
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15748
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Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15745
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Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
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15746
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If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
223
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If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
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227
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You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
15747
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Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
210
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It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
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16151
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Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
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211
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If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
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228
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Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
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219
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If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
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220
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The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
218
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Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
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212
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The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
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213
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Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
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216
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If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
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215
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If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
214
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If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
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217
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Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
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