Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' and 'Metaphysics'

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34 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
11379 Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle]
12096 Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
227 You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
649 The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle]
223 If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
12094 No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
210 It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
220 The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
10948 Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle]
211 If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
219 If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
228 Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
16151 Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
633 If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle]
16110 If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle]
213 Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
216 If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
212 The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
218 Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
643 How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle]
215 If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
647 There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
214 If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
9483 Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle]
217 Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
16145 Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle]
618 There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle]
642 What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle]
645 If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle]
605 The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle]
640 All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle]
641 Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle]
16108 If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle]
4470 Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland]