Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Commentary on the Metaphysics' and 'Letters to Russell'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
18269 Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege]
     Full Idea: How are we to conceive of logical objects? My only answer is, we conceive of them as extensions of concepts or, more generally, as ranges of values of functions ...what other way is there?
     From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.07.28), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 epigr
     A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of what Frege means by an 'object'. But an extension is a collection of things, so an object is a group treated as a unity, which is generally how we understand a 'set'. Hence Quine's ontology.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
11209 The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna]
     Full Idea: The simple's whatness is its very self.
     From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 5.5), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.103
     A reaction: Aquinas endorses this Aristotelian view in Idea 11208.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
11204 The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna]
     Full Idea: The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness.
     From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 11/12.14), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)
     A reaction: This remark is not invalidated by developments in modern particle physics.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15036 An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Avicenna's 'indifference of essence' says the essence of certain things can become universal or singular, according to whether it is entertained by the mind (as a universal) or concretely exemplified as a singular thing. One essence can exist in two ways.
     From: report of Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'Sources'
     A reaction: This would appear to be a form of nominalism, since in the concrete external world we only have particulars, and it is our mode of thinking (by abstraction?) that generates the universal aspect. I think this is probably right.