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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence' and 'Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: According to the approach of Plantinga, Forbes and Mackie, the primary job of essences is to individuate the entities whose essences they are across worlds and times at which these entities exist.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4 n13)
     A reaction: A helpful simplification of what is going on. I wish those authors would just say this one their first pages. They all get in a right tangle, because individuation is either too easy, or hopeless. 'Tracking' is a good word for this game.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Fine assumes that essences can be identified with collections of propositions that are true in virtue of the identity of a particular object, or objects. ...There is not, on this approach, much of a distinction between essences and real definitions.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)
     A reaction: This won't do, because the essence of a physical object is not a set of propositions, it is some aspects of the object itself, which are described in a definition. Koslicki notes that psuché is an essence, and the soul is hardly a set of propositions!
We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: To make room for a less propositional conception of essence than that assumed by Fine, I urge that we distinguish more firmly between essences and real definitions (which state these essences in the form of propositions).
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6)
     A reaction: Yes. The idea that essence is just a verbal or conceptual entity would be utterly abhorrent to Aristotle (a hero for Fine), and it is anathema to me too. We intend essences to be in the world (even if we are deceived about that). They explain!