display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
| 13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
| 13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
| A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
| 10664 | Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: Complex particulars are of at least three types: masses (which sum, of which we do not ask 'how many?' but 'how much?'); composite individuals (how many?, and summing usually fails); and sets (only divisible one way, unlike composites). | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1) | |
| A reaction: A composite pile of grains of sand gradually becomes a mass, and drops of water become 'water everywhere'. A set of people divides into individual humans, but redescribe the elements as the union of males and females? |
| 10678 | The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: The relation of composition seems to be indispensable in a correct account of the part-whole relation for individuals. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 7) | |
| A reaction: This is the culmination of a critical discussion of mereology and ontological atomism. At first blush it doesn't look as if 'composition' has much chance of being a precise notion, and it will be plagued with vagueness. |
| 10665 | Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: We can employ Leibniz's Law against mereological atomism. Water is wet, but no water molecule is wet. The set of infinite numbers is infinite, but no finite number is infinite. ..But with plural reference the atomist can resist this argument. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1) | |
| A reaction: The idea of plural reference is to state plural facts without referring to complex things, which is interesting. The general idea is that we have atomism, and then all the relations, unities, identities etc. are in the facts, not in the things. I like it. |
| 10682 | The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: The fusion of five rectangles may have a decomposition into more than five parts that are rectangles. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 8) |