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Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'Presentation of Self in Everyday Life' and 'The Ages of the World'

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31 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11251 Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Plato argues that changing things, even if they are somehow real, do not have an essence; but Aristotle argues that changing things have a changeless essence.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4
12345 In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin]
     Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy, in the guise of form, has an explanatory rather than an ontological role.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance Intro
     A reaction: I take this to be the correct way to understand Aristotle, and the correct way to understand the concept of essence. We don't observe essences, but the concept of essence is forced upon us when we seek the best explanation of things.
16147 In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: Though he retains objects from the 'Categories', in 'Metaphysics' these yield their status as primary substances to their substantial forms. Concrete particulars are now secondary, and that which underlies everything is the substantial form.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
     A reaction: Frede says he moved from realism about substances to nominalism. Presumably substances within objects are real concreta, but forms are abstract, leaving the the object as a purely material thing.
12071 Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
     Full Idea: An essence is not a property (or a cluster of properties) of the substance whose essence it is, ...because no property (no Aristotelian property) can be the cause of being of an actual individual substance.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro
     A reaction: This is the third of Witt's three unorthodox theses, mainly in defence of individual essences in Aristotle. The first two seem to me to be correct, and the third one is interesting. I'm inclined to think that essences are powers, found below properties.
12084 Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
     Full Idea: Form is not an accidental property of matter, and it is not a necessary property of matter. These considerations make it unlikely that Aristotle holds form or essence to be a property of matter in the composite substance.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.5
     A reaction: I suppose form bestows the identity, and the identity gives rise to the properties. But you don't create identity on Monday, and add the properties on Tuesday, so forming an entity and giving it properties seem to coincide.
16119 Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: The Aristotelian universe is a world of tension and commotion - ordered and preserved by form, disordered by matter.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.7
     A reaction: This connects Aristotle quite strongly with presocratic predecessors like Heraclitus and Empedocles. But then it fits perfectly with modern discussions of entropy, and the forces that hold entropy back.
16148 Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's earlier 'Categories' theory of substance, and his later 'Metaphysics' theory, are radically different. The first is realistic, and the second nominalistic.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
     A reaction: Frede claims that 'Categories' is clearly earlier. It is certainly profoundly different from 'Metaphysics'.
16112 A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: In Aristotle's theory a substantial form can count as a proper subject, since the generic matter of which the form is predicated is in fact a property of the form rather than the form's being a property of it.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5
     A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand the idea of matter being the 'property' of a form, but 'matter' [hule] seems to be a particular way of thinking about stuff when it participates in an object, rather than just the amorphous stuff. Just 'predicated of'?
12002 Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung]
     Full Idea: Aristotelian essentialism is not correctly portrayed as the view that an essential property is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs at all.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation VII
     A reaction: The view I am arriving at is that essences are rather fluid things, which change their balance and constitution continually. Old people differ essentially from their younger selves. Chemical natural kinds have stable essences, but that is contingent.
16164 Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: The forms of sensible substances are not pure actualities; they in part are constituted by unrealized possibilities and in that sense are not fully real.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics p.90
     A reaction: Frede suggests that the form of the Unmoved Mover is the ideal case, because it is fully actual. I like the present idea, because it includes modal truths (i.e. dispositions and powers) in the form which gives a thing its nature.
11285 The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: By form [eidos] I mean the essence [to ti en einai] of each thing and its primary being [prote ousia].
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032b01)
     A reaction: [Tr. Vasilis Politis. Lawson-Tancred has 'what-it-was-to-be-that-thing' instead of 'essence', and 'substance' instead of 'being']. This may be the single most important sentence in 'Metaphysics' for understanding his theory of being. Cf. 'formal cause'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
16095 Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's theory also includes a special group of forms that can exist without matter, of which the Prime Mover is an instance, and these forms are separate not only in account but also in existence.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch 1
     A reaction: I am curious about her other examples. This must be the closest that Aristotle gets to his teacher's view of the Forms.
15853 A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Only those objects are substances which are being constituted under, and by, some nature, ..so that this nature, which is a principle rather than an element, is their substance.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b31)
     A reaction: My view is that Aristotle never got to the point of articulating his hylomorphism, so this is just him fishing around, and pointing to where others should investigate. What sort of 'principle'?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16109 Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The problem of unity disappears if our account is adopted. We allow a matter component and a shape/form component, one existing potentially the other in actuality. …The account is of a unity because one component is material, the other shape/form.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045a24)
     A reaction: It sounds as though the solution is that matter is material and form is abstract, so there is no rivalry. Elsewhere form seems more like a mechanism or a set of powers.
16088 Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: The solution to the problem of unity will finally depend upon Aristotle's doctrine of form as an active cause, or, as he refers to form within his broader theory of potentiality and actuality, an active potentiality [dunamis] or nature [phusis].
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], hylom) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro
     A reaction: Her intermediate proposal to the solution of the problem in Idea 16083 is that matter only survives through change potentially and not actually.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
12301 Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Everything has a sort of matter [hule], provided only that it is not a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [ti en einai] and a per se Form Itself [eidos auto kath' auto] but a possessor of thisness [tode ti].
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a01)
     A reaction: Kit Fine quotes this to support the claim that Aristotelian 'matter' is not confined to physical objects. Aristotle's essence is the form which imposes identity on the matter.
16092 In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Aristotle implies that matter is parasitic on the being of what it potentially is. …Hence if something is treated as bronze it is regarded as a composite and not as matter; only if it is treated as potentially a statue is it regarded as matter.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1
     A reaction: Note the distinction we should make of bronze as indeterminate 'stuff', and a lump of specific bronze, which might be a precondition for casting a statue. On Gill's reading, Greek 'matter' is much more specific than the modern word.
12300 Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter is comprehensive in its scope. It applies, not merely to physical, but also to non-physical objects; for they may have non-physical objects as their matter.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Kit Fine - Aristotle on Matter §1
     A reaction: My plea about bizarre ontological claims is always 'If you claim it exists, tell me what it is made of!' This Aristotle chap now offers them an instant answer to which I have no reply. They are made of 'matter', but not as we know it, Jim.
12077 Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's notion of matter, unlike ours, is of something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 3.1
     A reaction: This conforms with my idea of matter, as something active, containing powers, not some inert stuff waiting for the hand of God to bring it into life.
12103 Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's characterization of matter as potentiality and of form as actuality means that the form or essence determines what the matter is. So matter does not have any independent contribution to make to the definition and essence of the substance.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], matter) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6.2
     A reaction: We might say that of the wood which constitutes a lectern, but in the case of a magnet it seems that we are directly encountering the powers of the matter. ...though you might say that iron is the matter and magnetisation the form?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
597 Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Is there a house over and above its bricks?
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1033b19)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
10962 It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
     Full Idea: A subject which has no properties of its own at all is called by Aristotle 'ultimate matter', and it is hotly disputed whether Aristotle acknowledges that such matter exists.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.174
16142 A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There are two ways of being a substrate [to hupokeimenon], either as possessor of thisness (as the animal is a substrate for its properties) or as matter is a substrate for the actuality.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b05)
     A reaction: A bit confusing, since the possessor of thisness will obviously have what we call 'identity', whereas matter cannot have identity on its own (because it also needs form).
16103 A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: To avoid the outcome (possible in 'Categories') that the subject might be nothing at all, Aristotle insists that a legitimate subject must be separate and a 'this' [tode ti]. Forms and composites satisfy the revised criterion in different ways.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.3
     A reaction: I take it that we would say that a 'this' is an entity which possesses 'identity', and is perhaps countable. For Aristotle being a 'this' seems to require a possibility of definition. This is a powerful Aristotelian thought, needed in modern metaphysics.
10942 If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If you extract all other features of the object, what is revealed as being left over?
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a10)
     A reaction: This seems to be the key question in matters of identity, which leads us to talk of substrata, or essences, or substance, none of which seem graspable.
16575 Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is impossible that anything should be produced if there were nothing existing before. Obviously then some part of the result will pre-exist of necessity.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032b30)
     A reaction: This is arguing for a substrate on the basis of the ex nihilo principle. Creation needs raw materials as a basis. This may be the obscure 'prime matter'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13274 The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The contents of the formula which explains a thing are parts of the whole.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1023a24)
     A reaction: This is part of a catalogue of ways in which things can be parts [1023b08-25]. I like this, because it fits my general thesis, that the desire for explanation is the driving force behind our metaphysics.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
15852 A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In the case of a quantity that has a beginning, a middle and an end, there are those instances in which the order does not create a differentia, which are said to be 'sums', and those is which it does, which are said to be 'wholes'.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1024a01-5)
     A reaction: This is the reason why Aristotle is so much better than the run-of-the-mill naïve modern metaphysician.
15840 If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The syllable is something - not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else; ...that something must itself be either an element or composed of elements.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b16-19)
     A reaction: This pinpoints the key initial question, not just about the claims of 'holism', but about the whole puzzle of what give objects their identity?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
16136 A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The syllable is something in its own right, not just a heap of vowel and consonant but something different.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041b16)
     A reaction: This is the classic Greek example of a whole, and a slogan for claims that wholes are not merely collections of parts.
12878 Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons]
     Full Idea: Aristotle gives certain samples of 'hanging together', notably continuity, rigidity, uniformity, qualitative similarity, being of a like kind, being of like matter.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b05-) by Peter Simons - Parts 8.1
     A reaction: Families are scattered, lakes aren't rigid, cakes aren't uniform, complex gadgets have dissimilar parts, two kinds can be united, and only boring things are made of one sort of matter. Nice try, though. Simons rightly adds causation.